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“Our Father’s Programmes”: political 







The Botswana Democratic Party has ruled uninterrupted in Botswana since 
independence, but opposition parties have made significant inroads during recent 
elections. In the midst of this heightened political competition, President Ian Khama 
(2008- ) has sought to increase support for the party by remarketing the country’s 
employment-based programmes to serve new governmental objectives around 
employment and poverty reduction. Khama’s rebranding of public employment 
programmes (PEPs), especially the Ipelegeng Programme, has allowed government 
to target underserved beneficiary groups such as the urban poor, and provided more 
reliable incomes to out-of-work Batswana in rural areas. Critically, the rebranding 
of social protection programmes has resulted in their being publicly associated more 
with Khama himself than with government. Public displays of empathy for the 
conditions of the poor moreover, as manifested during Khama’s visits to 
disadvantaged areas, reinforced the president’s image as a poverty-sensitive leader. 
These programmatic and non-programmatic measures have together defined 
Khama’s social protection ‘brand’; or the public emphasis that the president has 
placed on his social protection agenda. For their part, opposition leaders have 
branded themselves around a “social-democratic” approach to poverty reduction. 
Since the 1990s, ruling and opposition parties have converged in their social 
protection ideologies as the BDP has “counterbranded” in response to electoral 
competition by adopting opposition policy ideas. Khama’s branding around 
personalised PEPs, in conclusion, generated strong support for himself among the 
rural poor especially owing to popular preferences for low-wage work over cash 
transfers. Using Afrobarometer survey data, this paper shows that Khama’s 
branding was insufficient to maintain the BDP vote, as the party’s poor performance 





Khama’s mandate and the state of party politics 
in Botswana c. 2008 
 
By 2008, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) had managed a feat matched by 
few other parties in any democratic political system: eight straight electoral victories. 
These electoral achievements were due in no small part to the ruling party’s 
stewardship of the country, which has featured an impressive record of development 
and economic growth. While the BDP had during the leadership of first president 
Seretse Khama (1967-1980) received the support of roughly three-quarters of the 
electorate, however, the popular vote percentage won by the BDP waned thereafter. 
Botswana’s first-past-the-post electoral system continued to afford the BDP a 
massive majority in the National Assembly, but its share of the vote declined to 55 
percent in 1994. The 1994 election also gave the opposition Botswana National 
Front (BNF) a significant voice in parliament, as the party won 13 out of 40 elected 
positions. Since 1994, elections in Botswana have continued to be characterised by 
this heightened political competition. 
 
The 1994 election forced the BDP to reflect on how the BDP could continue its stay 
in government. One way in which these party elites responded to the BDP’s decline 
in electoral support was to reconsider its leadership strategy. With comfortable wins 
through Botswana’s first five elections, the party had over time shifted its priorities 
away from politicking and toward a more administratively efficient (if not politically 
expedient) style of governance. This shift manifested itself in the selection of “an 
educated, mostly expatriate bureaucratic and technocratic elite” who were best 
prepared to advance the country’s development goals.1 Headlining this new 
leadership class was Festus Mogae, who became vice-president under President 
Quett Masire in 1992 and succeeded Masire as president in 1998. Mogae, unlike 
Khama and Masire, had been a career technocrat, first as a director at the 
International Monetary Fund and then as Governor of the Bank of Botswana, before 
joining the Cabinet in 1989 as Minister of Finance.2 
 
As president from 1998 to 2008, Mogae received accolades for his government’s 
AIDS eradication programmes and generally staid leadership style. But he devoted 
relatively little energy to ensuring that the political needs of the party were being 
met. Mogae once noted, “the problem with us in Africa is that individuals … are 
                                                            
1 Mwansa, L., Lucas, T. & K. Osei-Hwedie. 1998. The Practice of Social Policy in Botswana. 
Journal of Social Development in Africa, 13(2): 65. 
2 Sebudubudu, D. & M. Z. Botlhomilwe. 2012. The Critical Role of Leadership in Botswana’s 
Development: What Lessons? Leadership 8(1): 29–45, doi:10.1177/1742715011426962. 
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more important than institutions: political parties must be more important than their 
leaders [and] the government … must be more important than the president.”3 Yet 
as the 1994 election had demonstrated, the BDP needed a president who could re-
energise the party’s traditional bases of support, especially rural, elderly, and 
impoverished communities, as well as reach new political constituencies in the 
rapidly urbanising country that was Botswana at the turn of the millennium. By 
2004, the popular vote for the BDP had fallen further to 52 percent. 
 
In searching for a leader who could renew support for the BDP, the party’s elites 
turned to the man with the most famous name in the country’s history, Khama. The 
son of the first president and founder of the country, Lieutenant General Seretse 
Khama Ian Khama (“Ian Khama”) had been a member of the BDP for all of one day 
when he was sworn in as Vice-President of Botswana in April 1998. Nevertheless, 
his attributes and attitude toward government in other ways made him the ideal 
individual, at least politically, to become next-in-line for the presidency. His status 
as a tribal chief, a position he inherited from his father, gave his candidacy added 
appeal among Botswana’s rural populace.4 Moreover, Khama’s career in the 
Botswana Defence Forces, where he had occupied a commanding rank since he was 
in his mid-20s, congealed a party that had splintered in the late 1990s owing to 
suspicions of corruption by the Masire government.5 Though he lacked political 
credentials prior to 1998, Khama’s inextricable ties to the party positioned him to 
become a president who could restore the BDP to its historical pre-eminence. 
 
 
Drought relief, the economy, and the BDP’s 
ebbing social protection conservatism 
 
When Khama stepped into the presidency after an unremarkable ten-year stint as 
vice-president, he inherited a BDP development strategy that had been largely 
responsible for buoying the party during four decades of political leadership.6 The 
country’s lucrative mineral resources allowed the government to fund expansive 
                                                            
3 Naidoo, J. A Leader I Would Vote for: Botswana’s Former President Festus Mogae. April 4, 
2014: http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2014-04-04-a-leader-i-would-vote-for-
botswanas-former-president-festus-mogae/#.VVvcgkaZqVB. 
4 Sebudubudu & Botlhomilwe. The Critical Role of Leadership in Botswana’s Development, 42. 
5 Good, K. 2009. The Presidency of General Ian Khama: The Militarization of the Botswana 
‘Miracle’. African Affairs: adp086, doi:10.1093/afraf/adp086. 
6 Government minister David Magang called Khama a “closed book” as so little was publicly 
known about him. Ibid. 
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infrastructural development projects as well as to provide Batswana with healthcare 
and education at a rate that was not matched by any other country in the region. 
Economic growth of about 9 percent per year ensured that few voters would wish to 
challenge the ruling party’s stewardship of the economy for fear of “rocking the 
boat”.7 At the same time, early BDP governments implemented an extensive array 
of social protection programmes that initially featured support for farmers and, in 
the case of drought, extensive food aid for all Batswana who were unable to engage 
in livelihood-generating activity. 
 
In addition to its economic growth track record, the government’s early welfare 
programmes served as powerful motivators for the country’s (then) mostly rural 
electorate to support the BDP. Under Ian Khama’s father, the Accelerated Rain-fed 
Agriculture Programme (ARAP) and Arable Land Development Programme 
(ALDEP) supported smallholder herders and cultivators with livestock and farming 
implements. Both programmes were implemented during election years (1974 and 
1979, respectively), suggesting that the BDP wished to emphasise to voters that the 
party would continue to develop the country through agriculture.8 But the 
government’s efforts to develop agriculture in the late 1970s and 1980s were on the 
whole no match for the drought that would beset the country. 
 
When drought hit the country beginning in 1978, the government was forced to 
change tack. As President Masire explained in the party’s 1984 election manifesto, 
the government had been forced to shift its policy priorities away from institutional 
development in favour of relief from drought.9 At first, this response took the form 
of food aid, which was distributed in part through a Destitute Persons Programme 
(introduced in 1980) that made food baskets available to people living in chronic 
poverty.10 Drought forced the BDP by the 1980s to begin to provide social safety 
                                                            
7 Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. H. & J. A. Robinson. An African Success Story: Botswana. SSRN 
Electronic Journal, 2001, doi:10.2139/ssrn.290791. 
8 Mwansa, Lucas & Osei-Hwedie. The Practice of Social Policy in Botswana, 62. 
9 BDP Election manifesto, 1984. 
10 The Government of Botswana also features several more targeted social safety net schemes. 
These include Community Home-based Care (CHBC), which was launched in 1995 as a response 
to the HIV/AIDS crisis, and provides clinical medical assistance and a food basket to beneficiaries. 
The Old Age Pension, which was introduced in 1996 and provides a means-untested monthly 
transfer of P300 to Batswana over the age of 64. The Veterans Program (introduced 1998) provides 
a cash stipend of about P400 to veterans of World War II or their spouses. The Orphan Care 
Program, established in 1999 for minors who have two parents who are deceased, provides food 
baskets and other items such as schools uniforms and a transportation allowance. The government 
also sponsors extensive feeding programmes for “Vulnerable Groups” and primary and secondary 
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nets that could ensure food security for rural people.11 Social protection had been 
extremely limited under Seretse Khama, who had been reluctant to provide welfare 
that he believed would detract, both in funding and in focus, from development 
projects in infrastructure and education. 
 
In addition to prompting an expansion of the Botswanan welfare state, which slowed 
development, heavy drought in the 1980s hampered the ability of rural Batswana to 
engage in sustainable agriculture projects. Drought hampered the BDP’s agricultural 
development programmes such as ARAP, but also disrupted traditional 
livelihoods.12 The implications of this disruption were politically hazardous for the 
BDP. Indeed, it had been the ability of the Seretse Khama government to ensure 
social stability for the country’s historically rural populace that had underpinned 
strong electoral support for the party.13 Masire was aware that the agricultural 
production strategy was becoming decreasingly effective: 
 
‘We in the BDP were also concerned about the drift to towns for social 
reasons. In the rural areas, people had a traditional way of making a living 
and carrying on with their lives. In the cities, they either got a job or they 
just become lost souls. The traditional safety nets—going to live at your 
uncle’s place, or borrowing oxen from someone else to plough your lands 
if you had no oxen—had no parallel in the towns. We talked about it in 
cabinet; we talked about it in party meetings; and we talked about it in 
parliamentary caucuses. It was very much a part of our thinking as we 
developed our economic policies’.14 
 
The party therefore needed a way to maintain livelihoods and keep people 
productive, if they hoped to ensure stability, while at the same time avoiding losses 
to the rate of development.15 With drought in the 1980s continuing to limit 
agricultural output, the government decided it would employ people in development 
projects instead. This policy shift marked the end of the BDP’s initial “assumption 
                                                            
school students. World Bank, “Botswana Social Protection Assessment,” December 2013, 
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/17846. 
11 Mwansa, Lucas & Osei-Hwedie. The Practice of Social Policy in Botswana, 62. 
12 Sebudubudu, D. 2010. The Impact of Good Governance on Development and Poverty in Africa: 
Botswana-A Relatively Successful African Initiative. African Journal of Political Science and 
International Relations, 4(7): 254. 
13 Interview with Happy Siphambe, PhD, Professor, University of Botswana, October 22, 2014. 
14  Masire, Q. K. J. 2008. Very Brave or Very Foolish? Memoirs of an African Democrat. Ed. 
Lewis, S. R. Gaborone, Botswana: Palgrave Macmillan. 217. 
15 Sebudubudu. The Impact of Good Governance on Development and Poverty in Africa, 254. 
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that the rural communities had adequate systems of support for the welfare of all 
their members”.16  
 
Starting in 1982, the Masire government dispensed drought relief to able-bodied 
Batswana in the form of cash-for-work programmes in order to replace the income 
that was lost to crop failure.17 Drought relief (namola leuba) in Botswana during 
these years was not monotypic: food aid for vulnerable groups including children 
and nursing women, remote-dwellers, and other “destitutes”; cash in exchange for 
short-term work on local development projects for able-bodied adults.18 During the 
drought of 1992-1993, for instance, roughly 400,000 Batswana received food aid 
and 100,000 labourers were provided short-term employment for several months of 
the year. Jobs were varied but often involved infrastructure projects including the 
construction of “dams, roads, classrooms, community halls and houses for extension 
workers in the rural areas”.19 Labourers received a very modest cash stipend of 
approximately P130 per week, but the amounts were nonetheless sufficient to have 
“saved the lives of countless people”.20 Indeed, without these relief schemes, which 
ensured that rural household incomes declined only modestly during the extended 
drought of the early 1980s, the resultant disruption to rural communities would likely 
have upset traditional livelihoods on a massive scale.21 
 
Politically, the drought relief programmes that government implemented (on an 
annualised basis) throughout much of the 1980s proved a major impetus for voters 
in rural areas to support the BDP. According to the 1989 BDP election manifesto, 
the party “takes pride in the fact that despite periods of prolonged drought which 
have adversely affected production, Batswana have been able to maintain their close 
ties with the land.22 This is so because we [the BDP] have always been quick to 
introduce sound assistance programmes during periods of drought.” The BDP 
government’s implementation of drought-related welfare was extremely influential 
                                                            
16 Selolwane, O. 2012. From National to People’s Poverty in Changing Policy Regimes. Poverty 
Reduction and Changing Policy Regimes in Botswana. 134. 
cMunemo, N. 2012. Domestic Politics and Drought Relief in Africa: Explaining Choices (Boulder, 
CO: First Forum Press, 2012), 153. 
18 Ngonidzashe Munemo, Domestic Politics and Drought Relief in Africa: Explaining Choices. 
19 Mokganedi Zara Botlhomilwe and David Sebudubudu, “Elections in Botswana: A Ritual 
Enterprise?,” Open Area Studies Journal 4 (2011): 98. 
20 Gooch and McDonald, cited in Ngonidzashe Munemo, Domestic Politics and Drought Relief in 
Africa: Explaining Choices. 
21 Charles Harvey and Stephen R. Lewis, Policy Choice and Development Performance in 
Botswana (Macmillan, 1990), 282. 
22 BDP Election manifesto, 1989 
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in these years, with PEPs apparently driving significant political support for the 
ruling party: 
 
The single most important reason given by 
respondents … for being a member of the BDP 
was the Drought Relief Programme. Through 
this project, where many people are fed, 
subsidized, employed and assisted in so many 
ways, the ruling party has successfully resisted 
political inroads into its popularity, especially in 
the rural areas.23 
 
With BDP landslide victories in 1984 and 1989, 
including victories in over 90 percent of constituencies and a nearly two-thirds 
majority of the national popular vote, discretionary drought relief undoubtedly 
served both the party’s political and policy agendas in the 1980s.24  
 
The BDP’s political dominance seemingly assured thanks to discretionary drought 
relief, political concerns around social protection strategy began to make way for 
more technocratic considerations. As was announced in the BDP’s 1989 manifesto, 
drought relief planning would thenceforth “be tied to the overall [development] 
strategy because drought is a lurking danger in Botswana that the country must 
continuously be prepared to combat.”25 Assuming that the party’s electoral 
dominance would last, BDP leaders in 1991 decided to institutionalise spending on 
drought relief, which as a discretionary measure was proving to be too expensive. 
This institutionalisation allowed for “greater policy and institutional preparedness,” 
resulting in more comprehensive support for vulnerable populations during the 
drought periods that followed in 1992-1993, 1995-1997, and 2001-2005.26 
Politically speaking however, incorporating drought relief—and accompanying 
public works programmes—into the standing budget limited somewhat the 
discretion that incumbents had to determine when and how drought relief would be 
implemented. Whereas drought relief served as an important political tool until the 
1990s, its bureaucratisation decreased the potency of drought relief to drive electoral 
support for the party by the time Ian Khama became president in 2008.  
                                                            
23 John D. Holm and Patrick Molutsi, Democracy in Botswana: The Proceedings of a Symposium 
Held in Gaborone, 1-5 August 1988 (Ohio Univ Pr, 1989), 128. 
24 Ngonidzashe Munemo, Domestic Politics and Drought Relief in Africa: Explaining Choices, 
158. 
25 BDP Election manifesto, 1989 
26 Ibid., 159. 
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This decision of the BDP leadership to depoliticise drought relief, however, was not 
made with a complete understanding of how drought had fundamentally changed the 
country’s demographic makeup. Despite the early success of drought relief to 
strengthen political support for the party in the 1980s, the “incalculable harm” that 
drought had beset upon the rural populace, as Masire put it, had not assuaged the 
migration of many thousands of Batswana to cities and towns in search of new 
sources of livelihood.27 The government had “poured a great deal of money [US$13 
million per year] into drought relief to keep body and soul together for people,” as 
well as promoting the industrialisation that more than doubled per-capita GDP 
between 1980 and 1990.28 
 
Yet the magnitude of drought combined with the loss of many breadwinners to the 
AIDS pandemic toward the end of the 20th century sparked a demographic transition 
from rural areas to the country’s burgeoning urban centres.29 The population of 
Gaborone, once a small village, for instance, was growing at a rate of almost 15 
percent per year between 1971 and 1975.30 A country that was more than 80 percent 
rural-dwelling in 1981 became for the first time a majority urban nation by the time 
Ian Khama inherited the presidency in 2008. (In 2011, more than 60 percent of 
Batswana lived in urban areas.31) The BDP, unable or unwilling to invest nearly as 
much capital on job creation in cities as compared to rural areas, was as a 
consequence of this demographic shift losing its traditional base of electoral support. 
By 1994, the BNF had galvanised significant support in cities which featured many 
disgruntled migrants, leading to a significant dip in BDP support in the election that 
year. 
 
Another major catalyst of discontent for many Batswana was the government’s 
relative inability to convert public revenues into fully inclusive growth for all 
citizens. The BDP through the first three decades of its rule had relied on a 
tremendous economic growth rate—the fastest in the world from 1966 to 1989—to 
                                                            
27 Masire, Very Brave or Very Foolish? Memoirs of an African Democrat:, 218. 
28 Ibid.; From Reuters, “Botswana Appeals for Drought Aid,” Los Angeles Times, April 9, 1987, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1987-04-09/news/mn-490_1_drought-aid. 
29 Amy R. Poteete, “The Absence of Intergroup Violence in Botswana: An Assessment of the 
Role of Development Strategies,” The Economic Roots of Conflict and Cooperation in Africa, 
2013, 183. 
30 Coralie Bryant, Betsy Stephens, and Sherry MacLiver, “Rural to Urban Migration: Some Data 
from Botswana,” African Studies Review 21, no. 02 (September 1978): 85–99, 
doi:10.2307/523664. 




be the “rising tide that lifted all ships.”32 Ample public revenues allowed the 
government to make investments in education, infrastructure, and health. Beyond 
these strategic investments, however, the early BDP leaders followed a frugal public 
policy. This “parsimonious,” market-oriented development brand, as Seekings 
characterised the early BDP governments, fostered only minimal inclusion in 
economic participation for Botswana’s poor.33 Therefore, while GDP per capita rose 
from US$50 in 1967 to US$2,583 in 1991, the benefits of growth did not trickle 
down fully to the masses, especially to the rural poor. Persistent poverty, which was 
in large part the outcome of the government’s heavy reliance of mineral extraction 
to drive economic growth, characterised much of the populace even at the end of the 
millennium.34 Nearly one-third of the country was still living on less than US$1.25 
per day in 2002-2003 with a majority of this population inhabiting the rural parts of 
the country.35 The BDP’s historical strategy of fiscal conservatism, though it ensured 
the government had resources to spare on expanding drought relief, did little to 
mediate the country’s uneven wealth distribution through inclusive job creation..36 
By the turn of the 20th century, Botswana had become one of the most unequal 
societies in Africa. 
 
The task of Ian Khama by the late 2000s was therefore to generate support for a party 
whose historical support base had been significantly reduced, owing to the effects of 
drought and insufficiently inclusive growth. To help overcome this handicap, the 
president relied on a new social protection strategy. Specifically, he strengthened the 
government’s old public employment programmes (PEPs), which had been 
associated with drought relief, and then re-purposed them to reflect a new public 
focus on poverty reduction through employment creation. By changing the way the 
government’s employment-based social protection programmes were being 
marketed and by strengthening them further, Khama could better address national 
unemployment concerns and broaden the scope of programmes to include the urban 
as well as rural poor. These programmatic efforts to recast the government’s 
                                                            
32 Charles Harvey, “Botswana: Is the Economic Miracle Over?,” Journal of African Economies 
1, no. 3 (November 1, 1992): 335–68. 
33 Seekings, Jeremy, “Welfare Reform and the Conservative Social Contract: Botswana under 
Botswana Democratic Party Governments, 1994-2010,” forthcoming 2015. 
34 Lesego Sekwati, Nettimi Narayana, and Mpho Raboloko, “Understanding the Nature of 
Household Poverty in Botswana,” Pula: Botswana Journal of African Studies 26, no. 1 (2013): 
71–82. 
35 BIDPA and International Poverty Centre, “Poverty Status Report for Botswana: Incidence, 
Trends, and Dynamics,” Research Project Report, (September 2005), 41. 
36 Kempe Ronald Hope Sr and Wayne A Edge, “Growth with Uneven Development: Urban-




decades-old public employment strategy were characteristic of the Khama social 
protection “brand,” as the following section will elucidate. 
 
 
Introduction: Khama PEPs 
 
Under Ian Khama, the government’s discourse around public works schemes 
changed. The BDP Minister of Finance Baledzi Gaolathe, whose service spanned 
the Mogae and Khama governments, articulated the new emphasis around PEPs in 
his 2009 Budget Speech to the National Assembly. “In the past, Government 
addressed poverty through a number of strategies including provision of 
infrastructure and basic services,” Gaolathe noted.37 “As we refine our anti-poverty 
initiatives, we will now place emphasis on improving the livelihoods of Batswana, 
and engaging in productive activities.” The emphasis on productivity as a remedy 
for the country’s poverty challenges epitomised the programmatic aspect of 
Khama’s social protection brand. 
 
The most prominent programme to be the result of Khama’s re-marketing effort has 
been the Ipelegeng Programme. Botswana’s drought relief programmes essentially 
ended in 2008 with the introduction of Ipelegeng, which was known in its first year 
as the Labour Intensive Public Works Programme. Despite the name change, this 
programme resembled the old programmes in virtually every way, save for the fact 
that Ipelegeng operates throughout the year and regardless of drought conditions. 
Like its predecessor programme, Ipelegeng has employed vulnerable Batswana, 
though the programme restricts participation to working-age adults of a minimum 
eighteen years old. Ipelegeng participants are employed in jobs such as 
“maintenance of drift fences, [schools], health facilities, staff houses and 
government facilities; desilting of dams and storm water drains; [and] vegetation 
control.”38 The Ministry of Local Government manages the programme and, as of 
2014, disbursed salaries of P480 per month plus a daily meal (P100 per-month value) 
to labourers, who are employed six hours per day and twenty-two days per month.39 
With the national unemployment rate consistently exceeding 15 percent during the 
Khama presidency, the demand for participation among unemployed persons has 
been so high that local recruitment offices have had to institute a lottery system for 
                                                            
37 Budget Address 2009 
38 “Ipelegeng Programme,” Ministry of Local Government (MLG), n.d., 
http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--Authorities/Ministries/Ministry-of-Local-Government-
MLG1/Tools-and-Services/Services1/Ipelegeng-Project1/. 
39 World Bank, “Botswana Social Protection Assessment,” 29. 
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people wishing to work.40 The programme is self-targeting in that the meagre 
benefits mean that in practice only the poor participate.41 
 
Ipelegeng may have been in its structure rooted in drought relief, but the programme 
was also the culmination of a BDP policy evolution that, motivated by declining 
mineral revenues, stressed the need to engage welfare recipients in economically 
productive projects.42 An important policy document in this regard was the National 
Strategy for Poverty Reduction (NSPR), which was launched in 2003 during the 
Mogae presidency. Through the NSPR, the government sought to spark the 
establishment of economic empowerment schemes and job creating programmes 
that could also alleviate poverty.43 The NSPR’s central tenet was that the “self-
empowerment of citizens” should be the primary focus of any effort to achieve 
sustainable reductions in poverty. To this end, the authors of the NSPR proposed 
sixteen specific poverty reduction initiatives that would spur creation of 
employment, especially in rural parts of the country. While few of these programmes 
were ever implemented, the NSPR presaged the Khama government’s focus on 
reducing poverty by increasing productivity on state-sponsored projects. 
 
Another seminal policy document to which Khama often referred in his discourse 
focusing on poverty eradication was the Vision 2016. The Vision aligned the UN’s 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for Botswana with the government’s own 
stated aspirations to eradicate absolute poverty by the time Botswana turned 50 in 
2017.44 The document, which was introduced in 1997, just prior to Khama’s entering 
politics, established that “Batswana will be active participants … not passive 
beneficiaries [in poverty eradication] … [and that] while Government has an 
undeniable and critical role to play seabe sa Motswana mongwe le mongwe (“the 
role of every Motswana”) is [to] marshal his or her best energies and resources 
towards the realisation of the Vision.”45 Khama’s stated dedication to following the 
                                                            
40 Ibid., 4. The cited unemployment rates come from the Government of Botswana statistics 
bureau. These data consistently underreport the true rate of unemployment, according to several 
key informants consulted as part of this report. 
41 Poverty was measured in one representative survey by the number of cattle owned that 
labourers owned, a common proxy for wealth in Botswana. Among survey respondents, fewer 
than one-quarter owned any cattle. 
42 Interview with Happy Siphambe, PhD, Professor, University of Botswana. 
43 “Final Report for the Review of the Ipelegeng Programme,” June 2012, 
http://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/Botswana_2012-004_Final_Ipelegeng.pdf. 
44 Jeremy Seekings, “Welfare Reform and the Conservative Social Contract: Botswana under 
Botswana Democratic Party Governments, 1994-2010,” 2015, forthcoming. 
45 “Realising the Dream / Seabe Sa Motswana Mongwe Le Mongwe,” Towards Prosperity for 
All, n.d., http://www.vision2016.co.bw/vision-content.php?vid=31. 
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Vision 2016 document both in its means and its ends further shaped the president’s 
social protection approach.46 
 
 
Ipelegeng, the heart of the Khama brand 
 
Entering the presidency at the height of the global financial crisis, President Khama 
prioritised the creation of employment and the reduction of poverty in his early 
government. “Today, the country faces challenges that require further responses and 
initiatives,” he declared in his April 2008 inaugural address.47 “Areas that I feel need 
special emphasis are employment creation and poverty alleviation, programmes for 
the youth, health, housing and the fight against crime.” The worldwide recession had 
provided an initial impetus for Khama’s policy emphases during the early years of 
his government. The recession had entered Botswana through the diamond industry, 
of which Botswana is a leading international supplier.48 In 2008, the country’s real 
GDP contracted by 6 percent and jobs in the mining sector fell by almost 10 percent. 
Nearly one out of five Batswana lived below the poverty datum line and the 
unemployment rate was 18 percent, though this rate was no doubt much higher 
among the youth and in rural areas.49 Within four months of taking office, Khama 
introduced the Ipelegeng Programme as the principal agent by which to combat the 
effects of the recession, according to the party’s 2014 manifesto.50 But even after the 
worst effects of the recession had ebbed, Khama’s employment programmes 
continued to comprise a major focus of his policy agenda. Whereas discrete periods 
of drought were the spark that motivated former presidents to implement relief 
through temporary employment schemes, the fact that Khama’s programmes were 
not predicated on weather conditions but rather on the existence of poverty and 
unemployment ensured a continuing rationale for their existence. 
 
While Ipelegeng, Khama’s chief public employment scheme during his presidency, 
may have resembled structurally the former drought relief programmes and 
resonated with pre-existing BDP policy aspirations, the president’s efforts to realise 
these programmes and market them as central to his social policy agenda made them 
fundamentally his own. Without “reinventing the wheel,” Khama essentially 
                                                            
46 “One on One with President Ian Khama,” The Voice, July 18, 2014, 
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47 Inauguration Address, 2008 
48 United Nations Global Pulse, http://www.unglobalpulse.org/resources/brief-effects-global-
economic-crisis-botswana. 
49 “Data: Botswana,” http://data.worldbank.org/country/botswana?display=default. 
50 BDP Election manifesto, 2014 
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rebranded drought relief with a new public emphasis around combatting poverty and 
developing the country by striving for the employment of all able-bodied persons. 
Though Ipelegeng offered to beneficiaries only short-term employment of up to 
several months, the president declared it to be a “permanent programme and a 
poverty eradication strategy,” according to Presidential Directive 19(a) (2008), and 
“as part of our national development agenda.”51 
 
Khama’s decision to transform the government’s employment programmes from 
being predicated on drought to serving a broader goal of poverty eradication was the 
ultimate result of a realisation that in the drought-battered Botswana of the 21st 
century, government income relief needed to become less reactive and more 
proactive.52 With extensive drought making agricultural activity as a primary means 
of income perennially tenuous for smallholder farmers, Khama’s policy emphasis 
shift around employment programmes transformed them from being about 
mitigating loss to instead “providing needed employment.”53 That employment was 
in fact needed to ensure national Dignity, one of the four themes that characterised 
Khama’s policy agenda along with Discipline, Development, and Democracy (the 
“4 D’s”).54 As the president articulated in his 2010 State of the Nation Address: 
 
‘Our development goal is to ultimately ensure the dignity of all citizens 
through mutual respect and empowerment through productive excellence. 
This administration thus has as its ultimate vision a nation that is secure 
in its individual and collective accomplishments, while showing respect 
for others at home and abroad. If we pull together we can eradicate 
absolute poverty by achieving greater prosperity through self-empowering 
enterprise’.55 
 
“Dignity” and “enterprise” from the beginning characterised the Khama presidency, 
and although previous presidents had offered similar rhetoric linking the 
                                                            
51 Ibid. 
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55 Emphasis is mine. 
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government’s job creation and poverty eradication objectives, Khama reified that 
rhetoric with a considerable programmatic effort. Ipelegeng, specifically, has “taken 
centre stage and [is the chief mechanism through which Khama] seeks to achieve 
some of the aspirations [of the] 5 Ds development strategy.”56 
 
The early marketing around the Ipelegeng Programme was very much in line with 
the president’s articulated vision for national development. Most immediately, the 
decision to rename the programme “Ipelegeng,” which is often translated as “self-
reliance” or “people must carry themselves on their own backs,” marked an 
important discursive shift away from the “relief” programmes that had been 
associated with the welfare state under Botswana’s three former presidents. This 
concept of self-reliance has been an important rhetorical preoccupation of the 
Khama presidency and the Ipelegeng Programme has undoubtedly served to reify 
that new discursive emphasis. “Where we once practised self-reliance (ipelegeng), 
at both the individual and community levels, we now too often tend to rely on others 
and the State to provide for us,” commented Khama on what he believed to be the 
nation’s prevailing mindset toward work.57 
 
PEPs under Khama were therefore no longer about compensating for income lost to 
drought, but rather mechanisms for achieving self-development. According to the 
government’s website, Ipelegeng “shifted its focus from drought relief to poverty 
alleviation in 2008,” a statement that simultaneously demonstrates the structural 
consistency between the old and new programmes, and notes the Khama-era change 
in programmatic focus.58 Explaining the purpose for this shift in focus, Khama noted 
in 2012 that: 
 
Poverty eradication is no simple task, for one, a particular action of charity 
could motivate them to step out of poverty, but for another, the same act 
could make them governement [sic] dependent individuals, as such, 
programs implemented are always done in the best interest of the poor to 
help them realise that hardwork will lead to something good. Our vision 
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for ipelegeng isnt [sic] necessarily about giving people money and good 
food, but rather instil the idea and habit of waking up early to go and do 
something (work) with oneself. Remember, ‘laziness casts one into a deep 
sleep, and an idle person will suffer hunger.’59 
 
This mandate to have the individual participate in his or her own development had 
been the clarion call of the NSPR and Vision 2016, but Khama was the first president 
to realise, through Ipelegeng, its prescription in a programmatic way. 
 
The president has furthermore positioned Ipelegeng at the centre of his effort to 
project a policy focus around discipline. In his 2008 inauguration address, Khama 
declared that “No democracy can exist without discipline”—another pillar of his “4 
D’s”—which confirmed the sentiment that many Batswana had already ascribed to 
the former military commander.60 Efforts to eliminate poverty and develop the 
country, Khama suggested from early on his presidency, would necessitate a 
heightened work ethic, something that the president has frequently argued must 
change in Botswana. Only with this “mindset change,” as the president emphasised 
in his 2009 State of the Nation Address, could Batswana achieve the country’s other 
policy aspirations: Dignity, Development, and Democracy.61 Ipelegeng has thus 
been an important manifestation of the president’s drive to cultivate an image of 
strong leadership, necessary for the development of the country. 
 
Part of this presidential discourse on discipline was centred on the importance of 
citizen participation in the economy. Commenting on the role of Ipelegeng to 
reengage unemployed and impoverished able-bodied Batswana, Khama declared 
that “Instead of just sitting around [and] doing nothing, at least they [Ipelegeng 
labourers] can be contributing to the local communities whilst earning something 
and growing their local economies.”62 Khama challenged further in his 2011 State 
of the Nation Address “all able-bodied citizens to take pride in fending for 
themselves and contributing towards the development of their country.”63 The 
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president’s broader moves to transition the Botswanan welfare state away from 
beneficiaries’ passive receipt of welfare (drought relief) to active participation in 
development (“self-reliance”) accompanied parallel reforms. For instance, shortly 
after taking office Khama ordered a review of the Destitute Persons Programme after 
completion of which he announced that 8,765 beneficiaries were able-bodied and 
would thus be moved to the Ipelegeng Programme.64 The president’s actions around 
participation in this regard were fundamental to building up his broader social 
protection brand around work. 
 
Ipelegeng, as judged by consistent spending rises, has occupied an increasingly 
sizable role in defining the Khama presidency. Beginning in the 2009-2010 fiscal 
year, Ipelegeng received P219 million and had increased its share of funding to P409 
million in 2012-2013.65 This nearly 87-percent increase in spending on the 
programme occurred, moreover, when the government’s total expenditure on 
“Social Safety Nets” increased by only 7 percent (P3,471 million to P3,698 million). 
Though the programme received relatively little funding at its inception, by the 
2012-2013 fiscal year Ipelegeng had become one of the largest social protection 
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schemes in Botswana, second only to the combined school feeding programmes.66 
In 2014-2015, during which time Botswana held an election, spending on Ipelegeng 
climbed another 42 percent to P580.6 million. As Ipelegeng accrued greater relative 
expenditure with each passing year, the programme came increasingly to 
characterise the president’s public policy agenda. 
 
 
Khama’s rebranded PEPs: engaging old constituencies 
and reaching new ones 
 
Ian Khama’s transformation of the government’s PEPs from being predicated on 
drought to serving a broader goal of poverty eradication resulted in a programme 
that could, to a greater degree than before, uplift both rural and urban Batswana. 
Early on, as the Minister of Finance noted in the 2009 Budget Address, the Labour 
Intensive Public Works Programme had begun to “provide relief in the form of 
supplementary income support to the poor and unemployed whilst at the same time 
carrying out essential development projects covering both urban and rural areas.”67 
By comparison, drought relief under previous governments had been apportioned on 
a district-by-district basis depending on the duration and severity of the drought.68 
Consequently, districts with urban areas often received less drought relief funding 
or even none at all. Ipelegeng, because it was implemented across the country and 
year-round, served a more geographically diverse beneficiary population. This 
extended reach of Ipelegeng thus conferred benefits to the urban poor as well, 
expanding the reach of a programme that has become very much associated with the 
president. 
 
Along these lines, one unusual aspect of the Ipelegeng Programme, especially given 
how the BDP has historically offered only targeted social protection schemes, has 
been the broad scope of its target constituency. In this regard, as one Ipelegeng 
project supervisor noted: 
 
‘While other government safety net or poverty programmes have clear 
criteria for qualification and hence targeting, this is not the case with 
Ipelegeng. For example, there is a specific criteria developed for one to be 
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defined as a destitute person or an orphan. Interestingly for Ipelegeng, 
poverty and vulnerability is by self definition. This means that anyone can 
work for Ipelegeng should they wish to define themselves as poor and are 
willing to work for the paltry P400.00’.69 
 
Maximising participation in the national economy, a theme of the Khama social 
policy agenda, has likely been the reason for why Khama has broadened the target 
constituency of the former drought relief PEPs. As one Village Development 
Committee representative responsible for implementation commented, “we want 
and recruit everyone because we want everyone to get a chance [to work in 
Ipelegeng] whether you are old, young or a person living with disability … If you 
can work it is fine.”70 From these statements it is clear that Khama’s rebranding of 
PEPs has been the grandest manifestation of his stated intention to engage all able-
bodied Batswana, urban or rural, in self-development. 
 
Despite Khama’s efforts to extend his social protection programme to a broader 
constituency however, Ipelegeng seems to have had only a somewhat limited 
penetration into cities and towns. Of the 56,274 people working in the programme 
in May 2013, for instance, 18,034 (32%) were based in urban or semi-urban areas.71 
This ratio of rural to urban still meant that Ipelegeng had a more geographically 
diverse profile than the previous PEPs centred on drought relief, though like its 
antecedents still primarily targeted rural dwellers. With 11 percent of urban dwellers 
living below the poverty line, the programme was annually recruiting only a 
moderate fraction (about one-sixth) of the urban poor, though the number of 
participants was perhaps fewer than the Khama government had intended.72 Indeed, 
the Gaborone City Council reported in 2012 that the city was repeatedly failing to 
meet its quota for the Ipelegeng Programme.73 Khama himself complained, during 
one of his many visits to Gaborone (and to communities around the country), that 
“people residing in Gaborone do not come forward to work for the Ipelegeng 
programme.”74 Though Khama’s extension of PEPs to urban dwellers—a marked 
shift from the greater emphasis of rural targeting—has benefitted thousands of urban 
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Batswana, the programme has fallen short of what seems to have been its expected 
outcome.75 
 
In rural areas, by contrast, the programme has enjoyed strong approbation. 
According to one review, Ipelegeng “appears to be very popular among the poor 
people, especially those living in the rural and remote areas.”76 In these areas where 
poverty levels exist often between 40 and 60 percent, according to the Central 
Statistics Office’s 2008 report, the programme has elicited a great deal of support. 
As one community leader characterised the reaction to the programme: 
 
‘This Kgotla [tribal council] is usually filled up during recruitment for 
Ipelegeng because people have no jobs. … In almost all the cases, the 
programme is fully subscribed, and in some cases oversubscribed, 
especially in … settlements where no or very limited employment 
opportunities exists except for Ipelegeng. In almost all the districts 
surveyed, Ipelegeng is able to meet its quota and people are engaged on a 
rotational basis’.77 
 
Not only did Ipelegeng provide livelihood support to many rural communities, but 
the programme ensured that fewer rural people felt the need to venture into urban 
centres in search of work. According to a sampling of rural Ipelegeng participants, 
73 percent stated a belief that employment opportunities in the Ipelegeng 
Programme had stopped migration to cities; this observation was corroborated by 70 
percent of urban respondents.78 
 
Khama’s calls for greater inclusion of women in economic activity also matched a 
rise in PEP participation by women, exceeding the already high levels of 
participation in formers governments’ drought-contingent programmes. Women, 
whom Khama in the BDP’s 2014 election manifesto declared must be prepared to 
“participate in and contribute towards socio-economic, cultural and political 
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development,” comprised 77 percent of Ipelegeng participants in 2012.79 PEPs in 
Botswana have generally engaged a greater proportion of women than men, 
primarily due to the fact that fewer women than men have education and skills 
training that would allow them to more readily find stable employment.80 Indeed, 
over the five years between 1992 and 1996, some 50,000 people were employed 
annually in drought relief PEPs of whom between 60 and 70 percent each year were 
women.81 The slightly higher enrolment of women in Ipelegeng compared to these 
former PEPs, plus Khama’s rhetorical insistence on female participation in the 
economy, indicates that the president’s social protection brand might be understood 






Toward the end of his first elected term, Khama’s rhetoric on empowerment of 
vulnerable persons increasingly included mention of the youth. In his 2013 State of 
the Nation Address, for instance, Khama declared that “Poverty eradication and 
youth development are … leading priorities” for his government. The president’s 
efforts to engage young Batswana in gainful employment through PEPs has 
distinguished his commitment to youth empowerment from that of prior presidents. 
The Khama government’s response “to the needs of the masses through service 
delivery and schemes targeted at the youth and unemployed graduates” has, with 
Ipelegeng, comprised an important part of his dual poverty-unemployment focus 
and, by extension, his social protection brand.82 
 
Most prominent among Khama’s youth social protection initiatives has been the 
Botswana National Service Programme (BNSP). Following a 2013 State of the 
Nation Address in which he dedicated “at least 11 paragraphs of his speech to the 
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youth, the second longest time he spent on a subtopic,” the president announced the 
launch of the “new” programme.83 In fact, BNSP was the reincarnation of a former 
national service scheme called Tirelo Sechaba, which the government had 
terminated in 2000 because it was deemed, at an annual cost of P40 million, to be 
too expensive. In April 2014, the Khama government implemented BNSP, known 
colloquially as Tirelo Sechaba, “to engage youth in meaningful community 
development programmes, while giving them the needed experience for the world 
of work.”84 Participants, who range in age from 20 to 30, commit themselves to at 
least twelve months of service in their home communities, performing any number 
of low-skills jobs from distributing identity cards to maintaining parks to staffing 
crèches; all similar roles to the ones characterising Ipelegeng.85 BNSP remunerates 
participants, who numbered about 9,800 in June 2014, with an allowance of P500 
per month plus a bonus of P200 for each month worked that can be recouped at the 
end of the programme.86  
 
While BNSP provided relief to vulnerable Batswana, for Khama ostensibly it was 
yet another tool by which to engage people in the nation’s collective poverty 
eradication efforts. In explaining his motivations for pursuing implementation of the 
programme, he noted in a 2014 interview: 
 
‘What we [government officials] need to pick up on are those that are not 
doing anything productive…. By introducing Tirelo Sechaba [BNSP] we 
are saying that … Wherever you are we are engaging the youth in the 
activities … of their communities to be able to make an impact and a 
contribution within their communities. And we will be able to give them 
some allowance—yes, it is not a lot of money, but it is better than 
nothing—and so instead of sitting around and doing nothing, and whilst 
waiting for formal opportunities to come along, they can be useful’.87 
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Despite the current programme’s P178 million price tag—a much greater sum than 
the P40 million that caused the termination of the old Tirelo Sechaba, even after 
adjustment for inflation—the president’s emphasis on engaging vulnerable youth 
and increasing national discipline through economic productivity no doubt justified 
the programme’s restoration.88 
 
Khama’s other contributions to Botswana’s social protection network, though small 
in scope relative to Ipelegeng, further characterised his public image as a leader 
dedicated to uplifting impoverished Batswana through work. Chief among these 
initiatives has been the Poverty Eradication Programmes, an umbrella scheme 
featuring 22 small-scale farming and small business stimulus programmes that 
furnish grants to poor Batswana who wish to start their own enterprises.89 The mere 
fact that the president has equated “Poverty Eradication” with work reinforces the 
idea that Khama has marketed his government’s social protection programmes as 
necessitating citizen initiative. Despite the limited scope of around 3,600 
beneficiaries (at a cost of P104 million in 2012-2013), the president has nonetheless 
declared the programme as being one of the programmes that is foremost among his 
successful endeavours. 
 
All-in-all, Khama has held up his social protection programmes not just as hallmarks 
of his social policy agenda, but as being among his most important contributions as 
president. In a 2014 interview recorded four months before the election, Khama was 
asked—outside of any discursive context on social programme—“What milestones 
have you achieved so far?” and responded by listing “Ipelegeng, Youth Economic 
Schemes [including the Youth Development Fund], EDD [Economic Diversity 
Drive], Poverty Eradication….”90 The fact that Khama has dedicated his presidency 
to implementing PEPs that encompass a numerically expanded and more diverse 
beneficiary pool as compared to antecedents has reinforced a political brand that is 
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“Our Father’s programmes”: personalising social 
protection 
 
One significant effect of Khama’s pursuing a work-oriented social protection 
agenda, including the rebranding of pre-existent PEPs to align with his poverty 
reduction discourse, has been a popular association of programmes, not with 
government per se, but with Khama personally. According to one observer: 
 
‘Under Mogae [social protection programmes] were not taken as the 
president’s initiatives. They were just public programmes. But the tone 
has changed [under Khama]. People speak of these programmes: they call 
them “mananeo a ga Rara.” In our language it means “our Father’s 
programmes”—“our Father” being the president. … These are Ian 
Khama’s programmes. They were here before, but the way they’ve been 
marketed since he came into office is that these are his programmes [and] 
… they are attributed directly to his benevolence. … They are public 
programmes but they are there because of the current president. That’s 
how it’s marketed’.91 
 
This personalisation of what would otherwise have been government PEPs has 
resulted in Khama becoming “a messiah amongst the ordinary people who are 
beneficiaries of his ‘pet projects’.”92 To impoverished rural citizens with otherwise 
no access to stable employment, moreover, Khama has “become synonymous with 
government”.93 
 
Popular approbation for Khama’s social protection approach, which has centred on 
what many citizens perceive as being the president’s own PEPs, have been 
reinforced by the president’s own actions. UNICEF’s 2012 review of Ipelegeng, for 
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instance, included an observation that “the programme is given preference over 
others [i.e., other social protection programmes] because it was initiated by the state 
President”.94 Khama’s frequent tours to meet with rural communities throughout the 
country have also allowed him to reinforce the rhetoric around creating jobs and 
poverty reduction that has comprised substantial parts of his public addresses. “At 
the kgotla meetings that he addressed, Khama often played the star at the expense of 
his ministers as he made the important pronouncements instead of leaving that to the 
concerned ministers,” commented one observer.95 Whereas former presidents had 
generally opted to prescribe policies from the State House, Khama’s populism has 
resulted in his becoming the literal face of his programmes. 
 
These efforts, though they have served to reinforce Khama’s political brand among 
the rural poor, nonetheless have not avoided criticism from urban intellectuals. 
Dumelang Saleshando, leader of the opposition Botswana Congress Party (BCP), 
lambasted the president who, he scorned as being “still on the learning curve of how 
the people he leads live by sitting around kgotla fires with them, while there are 
critical issues of development, high unemployment, delayed infrastructure that the 
president and his cabinet must be firmly addressing”.96 Though not all critics have 
fingered Khama for striving to enhance his political image directly through the 
personalisation of social protection programmes, for some observers it was 
problematic enough for the president to be “allowing his supporters to personalise 
government programmes and projects by [their] appendaging [sic] them to his 
name.”97 Regardless of who was responsible for marketing the government’s PEPs 
as being fundamentally Khama initiatives, the fact that these programmes had 
become personalised and ascribed to “Our Father” indicates the popularity that their 
ostensible sponsor Khama enjoyed. 
 
 
Opposition branding, BDP counterbranding 
 
Since 1994, opposition political parties in Botswana have become a significant force. 
In elections that year, the BNF won a then-unprecedented 37 percent of the vote (13 
of 40 seats) in large part due to the support of recent rural migrants to cities and other 
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urban dwellers upset with the government’s to stimulate job growth.98 The 
ideological “father” of the BNF was its presidential candidate in 1994, the socialist 
firebrand Kenneth Koma. The founder, a Soviet-schooled intellectual who, despite 
his family’s considerable wealth, fashioned himself with crumpled clothes and 
adopted Setswana colloquialisms in a way that substantiated the “man of the people” 
image that he intended to portray.99 According to a contemporary observer: 
 
A substantial section of the electorate supports [the BNF] because its 
political message seems to be relevant to the socio-economic conditions 
of contemporary Botswana. The issues which it has stressed in its 
campaigns such as affordable housing, employment creation, better 
working conditions and the revamping of the education system resonate 
with more conviction amongst urban and peri-urban dwellers than 
amongst the peasantry.100 
 
Koma’s campaign tactics in 1994, moreover, signified his commitment to reforming 
government in a way that would benefit the urban poor, for instance, by arranging 
for a motorcade of 600 vehicles carrying every BNF parliamentary candidate to 
parade through the Gaborone slum of Old Naledi, Koma’s self-appointed “political 
bunker.”101 The BNF president, whose towering stature in the party inspired the 
codename “Party ke Koma” (“Koma is the party”), came to be known as an urban 
“messiah” among the poor and working-class communities of urban Botswana. His 
advocacy on behalf of youth activists seeking to have the age of suffrage changed 
from 21 to 18 years old—a policy that the BDP initially opposed—furthered his 
being seen as the youth’s foremost advocate in politics.102 
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Inspired by the political brand of their ideologue Koma, party leaders issued a 
manifesto in 1994 that was designed to appeal to a growing urban working-class 
base. According to the manifesto, the BNF government would pursue “a strong civil 
society, and social welfare for the underprivileged members of our society,” and 
listed among its objectives the creation of an old age pension, dependent and orphans 
benefit, a contributory pension programmes, and unemployment benefits.103 These 
proposals largely shaped the party’s social protection agenda, which were integral 
parts of its larger “social democratic programme.”104 
 
The BCP emerged ahead of the 1999 election after disagreements with the 
commandeering Koma resulted in the defection of eleven MP’s led by former anti-
apartheid activist Michael Dingake. A “social democratic” 
programme also characterised the BCP brand.105 The party’s 
1999 manifesto, for instance, included the promise that the 
BCP would “introduce an orphan policy that guarantees 
social welfare support to all orphans (AIDS and non-AIDS 
orphans) and their primary carers” and criticised the BDP for 
lacking a “comprehensive social security and welfare 
system… in spite of high levels of unemployment.”106 
Similarly to the BNF, the BCP declared that it would 
“develop a social security and welfare system which will provide to all people 
regardless of income, category of work, gender and disability.” 
 
Despite the fact that disagreements over leadership since 1999 have prevented the 
parties from unifying, members from both sides have noted that the two camps are 
ideologically alike. As BCP co-founder Paul Rantao observed, “the [BCP] party’s 
ideology will not be that different from [that] of the BNF. Its focus will be to try to 
articulate the interests of workers and the youth.”107 Resisting pressure to integrate 
with the dominant BNF, the BCP has contested every election since its founding, 
achieving its largest delegation to parliament (four seats) in the 2009 election. 
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Though opposition parties have never ruled the country, the parties’ most lasting 
influence to date has perhaps been to force their ruling party adversary to incorporate 
their ideas into policy as a response to heightened electoral competition. Indeed, the 
opposition’s political inroads have been sufficiently worrisome to the BDP elites to 
induce “counter-branding” efforts with regard to social protection. In 1994, for 
instance, the BNF won unusually high support from elderly voters, which was in 
part what caused the BDP to receive less than 55 percent of the popular vote, an 
unprecedented low.108 (The opposition also won each of Gaborone’s four 
parliamentary districts for the first time). This vote capture from a constituency that 
had historically supported the BDP was apparently enough to motivate 
counterbranding by the party: in 1996, the government sponsored legislation to enact 
an Old-Age Pension in line with what the BNF had been promoting, though this had 
not before been part of the BDP’s platform.109 
 
In addition to inducing the implementation of the Old-Age Pension, opposition 
advocacy for an orphan care programme ahead of the 1999 campaign likely 
influenced the ruling party’s implementation of such a scheme that year. These 
policy shifts by the BDP toward opposition policy positions were starting to make 
apparent, as Molomo (2000) noted, that “the BNF has drawn the BDP closer to its 
position.”110 Supporting this notion is the fact that the rhetorical similarities of the 
ruling and opposition party manifestos have increased. The party’s manifesto in 
2004, for instance, noted that a BNF-led government would “introduce a 
comprehensive social security and welfare system (as opposed to BDP’s Old Age 
Pension) that will give every deserving Motswana a minimum level of dignity as a 
human being.”111 However, it was not clear with any degree of specificity in what 
ways the BNF social security and welfare system would differ from what the BDP 
had already implemented. The BNF manifesto from 2004 also included a promise 
that a new government would “spearhead job creation programmes that will be 
matched with timely action to distribute wealth equitably through a collectively 
financed policy of social security.” This rhetoric, though it too lacked policy 
specificity, signified what was becoming a convergence of opposition party ideas 
around PEPs and Ian Khama’s own ideas for public employment, which were 
introduced five to ten years later. The BCP, for their part, offered in 2004 to 
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implement a “comprehensive safety net for the disadvantaged, and work towards full 
employment, in recognition of the fact that employment is a human right.” These 
statements too resonated with the employment-centred poverty reduction strategy 
that Khama subsequently gave special emphasis. 
 
By the time Khama took office in 2008 and then pursued affirmation of his 
presidency in the 2009 election, the BDP had shifted its social protection approach 
dramatically since the party first came to power in the 1960s. Under Seretse Khama, 
the party brand vis-à-vis social protection was associated with food aid that 
government would disburse during drought as a relief measure. This later morphed 
into cash-for-work schemes, with the need for development project funding to be 
redirected to drought relief. Opposition inroads provided further impetus for social 
protection reforms, with the effect being that the ruling party began to counterbrand 
around features of the opposition’s social-democratic agenda. With Ian Khama at 
the helm, the introduction of Ipelegeng and other PEPs suggested that the party was 
evermore invested in managing a social protection agenda with the kind of broad 
scope that opposition parties had long-before advocated. To the extent that the 
parties’ brands around social protection were distinguishable by 2009, the principal 
differences hinged not on ideology but rather on leadership, programmatic 
implementation, and transfer levels to beneficiaries. 
 
This convergence of BDP and opposition party social protection approaches was 
further reflected in opposition party manifestos themselves. In the 1990s, opposition 
party manifestos offered several policy suggestions that the government under the 
BDP, which not yet shifted fully from its conservative 1970s-era approach to social 
protection, had yet to implement (e.g. the old-age pension).112 With BDP 
counterbranding accounting for a greater inclusion of vulnerable populations in the 
government’s welfare programmes by the 2000s, these opposition parties shifted 
tack in their manifestos to instead criticising the BDP’s inability to effectively 
implement existing programmes. In fact, coverage of social protection in the 2009 
BNF manifesto was essentially the same as it had been since 1994.113 Among the 
few differences between the two editions was a statement in the 2009 version 
describing the BNF as “the true Party of the masses, especially the poor, the working 
class, the peasants and sections of the middle class.” What exactly motivated this 
insertion remains uncertain, but it was no doubt a possible reflection of a concern—
with the BDP having significantly expanded the welfare state to include vulnerable 
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groups—that the BNF needed to double down to voters on the party’s commitment 
to best representing the interests of Botswana’s poor. 
 
Neither did the BCP offer new social protection policy ideas in their 2009 manifesto. 
The party did contend that the Old-Age Pension transfer amount should be trebled 
to P750 from P250 and the age of qualification lowered from 65 to 60 to match the 
legal age of retirement.114 The opposition parties’ criticisms of Khama and the ruling 
party were extensive, but on the government’s role in pursuing social protection and 
poverty eradication, all three major parties in their manifestos did not significantly 
differ in terms of substantive policy ideas. According to BNF activist Bashi Mothusi, 
the parties “don’t so much disagree with BDP’s ideas around social protection; they 
just have qualms with the implementation and the amount of the transfers.”115 With 
Khama advancing a social protection brand that did not differ significantly in 
ideology from what opposition leaders have proposed to implement, elections in 
2009 and 2014 seemed to be more referendums on Khama and/or the BDP leadership 
than on any substantive policy distinctions between parties. 
 
In addition to shifting its social protection 
policy approach in response to increasing 
popular support for opposition parties, BDP 
with Khama at the helm has also adjusted its 
political strategy. Khama’s status as a 
paramount chief and stature as the son of the 
first president were likely salient features of 
his public identity, but they have also 
facilitated a campaign-style leadership tactic 
to which many observers have ascribed his 
political popularity in rural areas of Botswana.116 The president has been eager to 
traverse the country and in doing so has cultivated the perception that he has taken 
a strong interest in the welfare of the poor. Khama’s visits to rural areas also 
routinely involve participation in the work of poverty alleviation by his own hands. 
In addition to convening kgotla meetings in which he invites local community 
leaders to offer ideas and air grievances, the president has been extensively 
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documented and photographed serving meals from breadlines, distributing care 
baskets, and delivering radios and blankets to elderly Batswana.117 
 
Khama’s populist behaviour has clearly endeared him to rural Batswana, many of 
whom regard the president positively for these demonstrations of empathy. Edgar 
Tsimane, a Motswana journalist, remarked on the president’s appeal among 
vulnerable persons: 
 
‘Khama wears so many hats: son of the first president of the country, king 
of Bamangwato tribe in central district, former soldier, commander-in-
chief. Young boys would think of him as the guy who cannot be shot. … 
He’s popular also because part of his administration is creating a social 
safety net that borders on handouts. He likes to go around the country 
travelling, handing out blankets to the poor, and they all clamour after him 
to shake his hand’.118 
 
Others, such as one parliamentarian, were not as charitable as Tsimane: “The 
president seems comfortable sitting around the bonfire with old men in rural areas, 
distributing food hampers and blankets, and behaving like King, or Father 
Christmas.”119 Responding to such critics, who have contended that his extension of 
blankets, radios, food, and other handouts to all the vulnerable communities he visits 
have essentially bought votes for the BDP, Khama stated that “I cannot understand 
why somebody will want to criticise anybody for helping people in need.”120 
Regardless of the controversy his tactics have solicited in the press, Khama’s 
personal interactions with the rural poor have strengthened the poverty emphasis of 
his political brand and have, moreover, reinforced his commitment to ensuring the 
welfare of the BDP’s historical base. 
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Khama’s leadership style was further characterised by overtures to the urban poor in 
a way that was at least in effect a response to the urban populism of Kenneth Koma 
and the mid-1990s BNF. The president in 2009, seemingly in an attempt to “out-
populist” Koma’s stunt from fifteen years earlier, rode a bicycle around the Old 
Naledi neighbourhood of Gaborone 
during the week leading up to the 
election.121 While the event drew scorn 
from those pundits who deemed the 
president’s actions a “populist stunt,” 
it was clear that Khama was seeking to 
manufacture an image of himself and 
of the BDP as being sympathetic to the 
plight of the urban poor.122 To 
redouble his claim, Khama repeated 
the ride one week before the 2014 
elections.123 Campaign tactics such as these rallies revealed Khama’s intent to brand 
himself as a leader in touch with Botswana’s most vulnerable citizens, be they rural 
or urban. 
 
This populist leadership style of the new president has been moreover in stark 
contrast to the “educated, mostly expatriate bureaucratic and technocratic elite” of 
Mogae and the previous government. The former president, in contrast to Khama, 
had generally manifested his commitment to fighting poverty by participating in 
multilateral conferences, such as at the African Union and the United Nations, and 
“wouldn’t be seen mingling with the poor.”124 Khama has generally avoided 
participation in such forums, preferring to send envoys in his stead.125 Like his anti-
poverty PEPs, including Ipelegeng, which have broadened the scope of the BDP’s 
programmatic efforts to encompass more urban constituents in social protection, 
Khama’s campaign-style tactics have been targeted at a wider range of Batswana, 
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including both urban and rural citizens, with the intention being to counterbalance 
opposition support among the urban poor. 
 
 
Social protection and the 2014 election 
 
The 2014 election featured extensive discussion of social protection approaches and 
programmes. The Ipelegeng Programme was the target of much scorn from 
opposition leaders, who decried the president for touting his job creation record 
when many of the jobs were short-term stints of employment offered through 
Ipelegeng. Dumelang Saleshando of Gaborone, the BCP’s candidate for president, 
scolded the president for this kind of rhetoric, saying that “Khama through his 
various States of the Nation addresses refers to Ipelegeng statistics to give an 
indication of the extent to which his government has created jobs.126 He went on to 
say that “while labour intensive public works to alleviate the economic desperation 
faced by the poor is accepted globally, Ipelegeng is never regarded as a job creation 
scheme.”127 Critiques of Khama’s conflation of Ipelegeng expansion and job 
creation also emanated from members of the Umbrella for Democratic Change, the 
BNF-led coalition of opposition parties (save the BCP) that contested the 2014 
election. Mohammed Khan, a UDC MP from Molepolole, for one, remarked on the 
floor of parliament that the government ought rather “to look at how we can get 
people out of Ipelegeng,” adding that the country “should have a President that says 
to us ‘we reduced the number of Ipelegeng beneficiaries from 61,000 to 48,000 
because we created [private-sector] jobs.’”128 
 
Criticism from opposition politicians also targeted the president for increasing 
dependency on the state among poor Batswana, many of whom seek out several 
terms of employment through Ipelegeng, instead of equipping them with skills to 
earn employment in the private sector. Many in the opposition camp, among whom 
Ipelegeng has been referred to as atlhama ke go jese (“open your mouth and let me 
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feed you”), have dismissed the programme as being more about handouts than 
empowerment.129 Statements such as these are in line with the conclusion of a 
UNICEF programme review that says “Ipelegeng gives people fish without teaching 
them how to fish.”130 Other politicians decried the president for channelling the poor 
into Ipelegeng without a strategy to lift them into true self-reliance. These critics 
included Duma Boko, Gaborone lawyer and UDC presidential hopeful, who 
declared at a rally that “when Khama looks at you, he sees herders, Ipelegeng 
workers. We at the UDC we see among you doctors, engineers, lawyers.”131 While 
Khama’s rhetoric suggests an effort to cultivate a brand heavy on job creation for 
low-income Batswana, the opposition elites sought to degrade Khama’s image by 
portraying him as being uninterested in real development ends. 
 
For his part ahead of the October election, President Khama worked to strengthen 
the case he had been making all along that his efforts to increase the productivity of 
the country were the only sustainable way that the nation’s poor could lift themselves 
out of poverty. In May 2014, for instance, he announced the National Work Ethic 
Programme and dedicated “facilitators” to reinforce his public emphasis on 
increasing the nation’s individual enterprise.132 In April, the president also (re-
)launched the BNSP, which he reported had recruited more than 11,200 
participants.133 He also defended his record around poverty reduction and 
employment growth. At the party’s 7 April campaign launch, for instance, Khama 
was reported to have said that he would “not apologise for introducing programmes 
such as Ipelegeng and Tirelo Sechaba.”134 Rather, in August 2014, the president 
announced increases to the remuneration package for Ipelegeng, other PEPs, and the 
Old-Age Pension.135 The party’s manifesto, moreover, showcased Ipelegeng as a 
leading policy achievement of Khama’s presidency and included a promise to 
“strengthen flagship programmes aimed at poverty eradication” should the party be 
returned to the government.136 
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Despite spoken criticism of how the BDP was implementing social protection 
programmes, what the opposition parties offered the country in their manifestos was 
not much different from the programmes of the Khama-BDP government. The UDC 
in its manifesto offered an extensive programme with short-term (A re tsogeng – 
“Let’s get to work”) and long-term components (Iphetlheleng khumo – “Create your 
own wealth”) for empowering the poor.137 The short-term plan, which was designed 
to “relieve the immediate desperation of our people,” proposed “Employment of vast 
amounts of labour for our envisaged infrastructure expansion programme,” an 
increase to the Old-Age Pension, and a tree-planting scheme. 
The long-term programme featured, among other objectives, 
a “comprehensive scholarship programme for people living 
with disabilities.” A final pillar of the UDC’s social protection 
offerings in 2014 (Tshegetsang bana – “Embrace the youth”) 
included “a solution to the youth unemployment … [through] 
new and vast infrastructure project that we intend to 
implement.” Without deviating significantly from the BDP’s 
structural approach to social protection, the UDC’s proposals 
for the country included higher transfer levels and replacements for Khama 
programmes, which the party claims “rarely concern themselves with lifting our 
people from poverty permanently or empowering them to find meaningful 
opportunity in the longer term.” 
 
The BCP in its manifesto offered a similar social protection brand to the UDC. In 
the manifesto’s section on “Protecting the Vulnerable,” the party promised that it 
would “create economic opportunities for all people who are poor and vulnerable as 
we believe that the best form of social welfare is work,” suggesting that BDP-style 
PEPs would be continued.138 Keorapetse confirmed in 2014 that the BCP would 
implement a cash-for-work scheme similar to Ipelegeng, but would factor into its 
programme a greater emphasis on skills development in order to more quickly 
graduate labourers into private-sector work.139 Though the party called for 
government to “reorientate social welfare policies and programmes towards a 
developmental approach,” there was no strong indication that social protection under 
the BCP would deviate significantly from the programmes that Khama had already 
implemented. In short, both opposition camps have consistently over the years 
striven to craft brands around social protection that are more social-democratic than 
the BDP’s in order to appeal to the urban working class and rural poor. Yet by 2014, 
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the ruling party had furnished an already comprehensive programme around social 
protection featuring many of the opposition parties’ ideas. 
 
When the results of the October 2014 election were announced, the BDP had 
returned a majority of legislators to parliament and Khama to another term as 
president. However, while the BDP in 2009 had stemmed their party’s trend of 
electoral decline by winning a 45th parliamentary seat (of 57) and increasing their 
share of the popular vote by two percentage points (53.3%), the party in 2014 fell to 
its lowest level of electoral popularity yet, coming away with eight fewer seats (37) 
and a 7-percent decline to less than half of the popular vote (46.5%). Despite their 
having been denied leadership of the government yet again, opposition parties led 
by the UDC coalition nearly trebled their seat count to 17 and earned the votes of 30 
percent of the electorate. The BCP fell to three seats, though the party increased its 






















































Both the ruling and opposition parties thus had reasons to celebrate the results of the 
election. The BDP earned the right to continue in government for a tenth consecutive 
term. Following the election, Khama selected as his new vice-president Mokgweetsi 
Masisi, a former MP who had spearheaded the president’s Poverty Eradication 
Programmes as Minister of Presidential Affairs.140 Perhaps another Khama action to 
reinforce his social protection-focused brand, the choice of Masisi, who is slated to 
become president automatically on 1 April 2018, reflected a desire by many in the 
BDP to find a successor who could continue to substantiate the party’s commitments 
to poverty reduction. The UDC in 2014 also achieved a victory of sorts by earning 
the most seats an opposition party has ever earned in an election, and together with 
the BCP demonstrated the growing appeal of opposition parties. Failure to topple 
the BDP, according to one pre-election editorial, would be “not because the 
opposition has not made inroads or that their manifestoes are not sound, but because 
the rural electorate … support the BDP because they rely on social grants.”141 
Indeed, Khama and the BDP may have failed to increase their overall support in 
cities, but by preserving their base of support in a large majority of rural 
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constituencies through the disbursement of social protection, the party demonstrated 
how it may be able to continue in government for many years to come. 
 
After Khama and the party won a tenth term, the BDP officials announced that the 
government would be continuing its 
investment in the poor. The Minister of 
Finance announced in the February 2015 
Budget Address that spending on the 
Ipelegeng Programme by nearly 10 percent 
in the coming year to P635.6 million, nearly 
treble the government’s initial expenditure 
on the programme. This was to be 
accompanied by spending increases on the 
Old-Age Pension, Orphan Care 
Programme, and the Khama-initiated 
Poverty Eradication Programme, funding 
for which was proposed to increase 54 
percent in 2015-2016.142 It remains to be 
seen what the president’s youth 
engagement strategy will be in 2015, 
though it is expected that BNSP and other youth-targeted programmes will continue. 
Having earned a tenuous victory in 2014, the BDP leadership appears content for the 
time-being to continue with its employment-based poverty reduction strategy.143 
 
 
Discussion: the potency of PEPs in Botswana 
 
There are several reasons to believe that Khama’s social protection ‘brand,’ which 
was fostered by PEPs rebranded to meet stated poverty reduction objectives, has 
likely helped the BDP to meet some of the political challenges, including drought 
and migration, that had effected a decline in the party’s electoral support since the 
1990s. For one, the president’s expansion of state welfare offered new lifelines to 
both urban and rural poor, which in a neopatrimonial fashion likely bolstered support 
for the BDP. The fact that transfer levels for Ipelegeng (P480 per month) have 
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consistently been higher than for minimum wage jobs in agriculture (P445 per 
month)—representing an effective raise for the rural working poor—may have 
further ensured ruling party popularity in rural areas.”144 Perhaps of even greater 
value to participants though were not so much the transfer levels but the amplified 
availability of employment itself. In comparing public views on workfare versus 
cash transfers, Seekings argued that “in general, low-wage job creation is the 
preferred option of both elites and citizens”.145 Khama’s decision to pursue low-
wage employment in lieu of a cash transfer scheme (e.g. basic income grant) has 
likely resonated with this sentiment in Botswana. Indeed, the ability of the 1980s 
drought relief programme to stimulate support for the BDP evidences how PEPs 
have a history of being strongly influential politically in Botswana. 
 
The societal value of paid employment in Botswana, as popular attitudes toward 
work in neighbouring South Africa suggest, has made low-wage job creation a 
potentially more politically expedient tactic than cash transfers to mitigate 
vulnerability. Vulnerable populations in South Africa, for instance, believed that 
paid work offered recipients dignity in a way that unconditional social grants could 
not. According to the results of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (2006), 
which featured 2,939 respondents, 75 percent of respondents disagreed when asked 
whether they consider themselves better off claiming grants than working.146 The 
idea, moreover, that people need to work in order to find dignity permeated the views 
of most South Africans in the study: 68 percent agreed with the statement that “A 
person has to have a job to have dignity.”147 Surender et al. (2010), who published 
based on the study, found that paid employment was highly valued by respondents 
both in and out of work.148 Nattrass (2003) noted further how pursuing the “dignity 
of work” for poor South Africans was, as a result of this prevailing social value, an 
important consideration for political elites.149 
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The cultivation of a sense of personal dignity was also a part of Khama’s stated 
intentions with regard to his PEPs. To the extent Khama’s programmes achieved 
dignity for their beneficiaries—according to one survey of Ipelegeng labourers, 85 
percent of respondents agreed that the programme had given them some dignity—
the president therefore stood to gain politically from this group.150 As one Ipelegeng 
labourer noted, the programme “has brought dignity, a sense of self-worth and 
independence to us because like everyone else we can go to the shops and buy 
ourselves food.”151 Cash transfer programmes, by comparison, may not foster 
dignity to the same degree as PEPs, especially for able-bodied adults. According to 
the FAO’s review of cash-for-work programmes in Somalia, “there is an intrinsic 
value and sense of dignity that is derived from households earning income from their 
own hard work and sweat that cannot be provided through unconditional cash 
transfers.152 
 
Khama’s decision to make low-wage work the hallmark of his social protection 
agenda therefore fostered the greatest degree of dignity possible for beneficiaries, as 
compared to other welfare strategies he could have pursued. For a president who 
made Dignity one of the five themes of his presidency, moreover, and claimed that 
his “development goal is to ultimately ensure the dignity of all citizens … through 
productive excellence,” implementing PEPs was likely the most politically 
expedient strategy to boosting the dignity of poor Batswana. 
 
Evidence suggesting that Khama’s programmes have become personalised to the 
point of being associated more with him than with government has likely also 
motivated political support for the president among Botswana’s poor. “Observers 
argue,” noted one journalist, “that the personalisation of the government schemes is 
a deliberate effort by the President and his supporters to make him bigger than the 
institutions he works under and hence portray him as indispensable.”153 Whether or 
not Khama intended this personalisation as an outcome of his programmatic agenda 
is a matter for debate, but in any case the effect has been the same: with the existence 
of popular programmes such as Ipelegeng perceived to be contingent on Khama’s 
leadership, it stands to reason that supporters of the mananeo a ga Rara—most 
notably the beneficiaries—would offer their support to the president in order to keep 
                                                            
150 The rate was 90 percent among rural respondents. “Final Report for the Review of the 
Ipelegeng Programme,” 93. 
151 Ibid., 86. 
152 Maham Farhat, Andrew Kardan, and Mohamed Gure, “Review of FAO Cash For Work 
Programme in Somalia,” 2014, 34. 
153 Edward Bule, “Will Khama Retire at the End of His Term?” 
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him, and by extension his programmes, in office. This contingency, and strong 
approbation for Khama’s programme generally among recipients, has given pause 
to opposition politicians who might have otherwise criticised Khama’s PEPs. The 
BCP’s Keorapetse, for instance, complained that “as soon as you mention the idea 
of taking away Ipelegeng that they [beneficiaries] depend on, people get upset, even 
if you only want to replace it with something better.”154 Had the same PEPs been 
institutionalised as programmes of the government (à la drought relief in 1991) and 
not of the president himself, political support for Khama among beneficiaries may 
have been less certain. 
 
Clearly, the Khama brand, as manifested through his social protection schemes, has 
boosted support for the party among programme beneficiaries and most especially 
the rural poor. What is less clear, however, is the effect that the president’s brand 
management has had in appealing to Batswana who were not recipients of recent 
state social protection programmes. On the one hand, Khama’s took sweeping action 
on his self-assigned mandate to create jobs and reduce poverty. On the other hand, 
the high degree of dependency that low-wage workers in BDP employment 
programmes experience suggests how the president fostered a clientelistic strategy 
aimed at increasing electoral support among specific groups. These ends, of course, 
may not be mutually exclusive. More information about how Batswana perceive 
Khama’s development strategy would first be needed in order to determine what 
effect they may have had in bolstering support for the president and the party. Absent 
survey data focused specifically on the president’s PEPs, data from the 
Afrobarometer survey in Botswana could offer some insights into the effectiveness 
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